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Abstract 
The present paper discusses issues of challenges of social security systems in 
Sudan. Following parameters advanced by ILO and UNCOSOC, those systems 
are analyzed. The conclusions focus on their applicability that faces axial 
difficulties mainly presented in the state of institutional interregnum facing 
the country. Moreover, it is important to revisit aspects of social cohesion that 
serves greater role in traditional social security in the Sudan.  
Published in concurrence with Social Science Research Network pages: 
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SIRN: International Comparisons Retirement and Income.  
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1. Introduction 
Social security is a paramount challenge to many countries much as to concerned 
organizations around the world. The International Labor Conference, 2001 
launched a campaign to extend social security coverage. Similarly, the World 
Commission (2004), established the declaration of providing a certain minimum 
level of social protection needs to be accepted as a part of the socioeconomic floor 
of the global economy. The DFID circulated a White Paper2 (2006) in the same 
issue while the UN ECOSOC High level stated in 2006 recognized that in the 
context of globalization countries need to devise systems of social protection with 
broader and effective coverage. Moreover, the G8 Labor Ministers' meeting and 
summit in 2007 recognized that in conjunction with economic growth and active 
labor market policies, social security is an instrument for sustainable social and 
economic development. 
The multitude crises around the world reinforced the perception that the 
extension of social security should be a high priority. In many developing 
countries' SSS were considered unaffordable. However, undeniably they are 
important investments to support sustainable economic growth. They play an 
essential role as economic stabilizers. At present, four out of five people 
worldwide do not benefit from an existent level of social protection that allows 
them to realize their human right to social security. That is essential to ensure a 
basic level of social protection and thus a decent life for people struggling just to 
survive. It is also a necessity and an obligation under the Human Rights Code. 
The generated term of Social Protection Floor is an initiative to provide a basic 
level of social protection and means as an access to essential services and social 
transfers for the poor and vulnerable. Within the scope of its mandate, the ILO is 
in charge of promoting the social transfer component of the social floor. An 
example is creating a basic set of essential social guarantees realized through 
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2 The Department For International Development (DFID) is a United Kingdom government department. It was 
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cash transfers that could ensure universal access to essential health services, 
income support and income or subsistence security. 
The SPF-I was adopted by the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations in 
April 2009 as response to the crisis. The ILO and the World Health Organization 
lead the Initiative. Many UN agencies and other partners such as 
development banks, bilateral organizations and NGOs, supported that 
issue. The improved coordination between these partners is at the core of 
the Program. The Social Protection Floor subsequently was integrated as a 
key element of the Global Jobs Pact adopted by the International Labor 
Conference 2009. The Pact provides an internationally agreed set of policy 
measures to build an employment-oriented framework for future 
economic growth. The ILO report to the G20 summit in Pittsburgh found that 
the employment effects as automatic stabilizers, including social assistance and 
benefits, were just as important as the effect of the stimulus packages. 
Governments that already had social protection schemes in place were able to 
cope with the crisis. The stabilizing role that Social Security Systems (SSS) play 
made them universally accepted instruments. Governments were able to use 
existing social transfer systems for the delivery of stimulus packages to respond 
to the heightened need for protection. The crisis acted as an accelerator in the 
social security debate. SSS not only respond to social needs, but they are an 
economic necessity. Thus, a new understanding of the importance of social 
security is required, as a condition to growth rather than a burden to society. 
Comprehensively, there are direct impacts of the crisis on social security 
financing and increased demand on SSS. The latter faces a number of long-term 
systemic challenges. The overall challenge they face in industrialized countries is 
the changing demographic environment. However, developing countries face 
these challenges with greater pressures. The main challenge, however, is to 
extend social security coverage by applying sustainable SSS. The start should be 
with a basic level of protection for all and then gradually build-on that base to 
provide higher levels of protection. 
Financing remains as a key concern for implementing sustainable SSS. ILO 
studies found that it is possible to finance the Social Protection Floor or some of 
its components even in low-income countries. For a comprehensive approach, a 
national social security strategy and a diagnosis of priority needs can help to the 
implementation of SSS. As countries achieve higher levels of economic 
development, their SSS should also, in parallel, extend the scope, level and 
quality of benefits and services provided. This can be done within the framework 
of ILO Conventions, particularly a wider ratification of its Convention No. 102. 
The SPF-I has set up a Global SPF Advisory Network to deliver technical 
assistance to countries that are committed to building, expanding, or reorienting 
their social protection systems. The Initiative provides support along every step 
in the process including policy design, awareness raising, legislation and 
evaluation. Many developing countries have already successfully taken 
measures. Among these are Mexico, Brazil and Chile. Argentina, China, India, 
Thailand, Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa introduced important elements 
such as family benefits, access to education and health services. Cambodia, 
Equator, Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin also have committed to start building 
their own Social Protection Floors.  
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2. The Country's Profile 
Sudan embodies the necessity for such schemes. During the past three decades, it 
has endured exceptional calamities, which ranged from natural disasters to 
undeniable political turbulences. Those had great impacts on all social security 
parameters in the whole country. 
The following table (1) reflects the country's main features as stated by the 
World Bank Reports (2009). It is apparent that there are rapid demographic 
expansion from the year 1993 and 2009 as estimated by 24%. The basic required 
services only increased by 12% and that only concentrated in urban areas. The 
country's agricultural base did not similarly expand whereas, the industrial 
activities diminished. Truly, communications and educational capacities, 
specifically universities largely expanded though with a lower quality efficiency. 
Other health and water facilities still do not meet the basic levels. However, even 
with improvements, rural population at large had little share in the development 
of social security. That is true in specific regions, which amplified during the 
conflict in Southern Sudan. Uneven development generated similar conflicts in 
its Eastern and Western parts. Infrastructure development remained limited to 
the central parts of the country though recent schemes where launched in the 
Southern and Eastern regions. The major impacts came with the collapse of 
irrigated agricultural schemes that played stabilizing role in food security. 
Privatization policies added shock to patterns of economic production known in 
the country whereas, irrigated schemes represented and played pivotal role in 
providing income for seasonal labor markets and refuge at periodic times for 
drought victims. 
 
Table (1) Sudan Country Profile 
Year 2009Parameters
41.3Population, total (millions)
2.2Population growth (annual %)
55.9GDP (current US$) (billions)
1,353GDP per capita (current US$)
8.3GDP growth (annual %)
58.1Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
69.7Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)
81.7Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)
1.4Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)
World Bank Tables  
 
According to the Human Development Report, 26.6% of the Sudanese population 
is not expected to survive to more than 40 years of age. Comparatively, in 
neighboring Egypt the number is only 9.9% and in China 7.7%. The early death 
of so many Sudanese can be traced to the violence but also to the lack of 
necessities, as health services, clean water or even food. More than 27% of the 
population do not have access to safe water whereas in Egypt a lesser 13%. In 
Sudan more than 30% have no access to health services, while in Egypt, 1%. For 
children under the age of 5 years, 34% are underweight, while in Egypt, 12%. 
The World Fact book estimated that the GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity in 2000 was less than US$1,000, which increased to US$1399 in 2009. All 
of these numbers underscore the difficulty of most people's lives in Sudan and do 
not represent the true picture in some disasters ridden regions. Increases in 
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calculated per capita income, however, does not transfer to all population. 
Disparities exit between regions, states and urban and rural areas. That 
translates into income gaps correlated with lack of social security specially in 
rural areas or civic conflict regions. 
 
3. Rural poverty in the Sudan 
Poverty in the Sudan is deeply entrenched and that is largely rural. It particularly 
affects farmers who practice rainfed agriculture. The phenomenon is more 
widespread in rural areas in Southern, Western and Eastern Sudan and in areas 
affected by conflict, drought and famine. The incidence of poverty varies 
considerably according to region. Partly, that is because economic growth is 
unevenly distributed and the economic and social devastation caused by the 
conflict in certain parts of the country. There are severe inequalities in terms of 
access to education, sanitation and clean water, infrastructure and natural 
resources, income opportunities, justice and political protection. Sustained 
economic growth was behind as presented in the extreme poverty rates that 
exacerbated from 77% in the 1990s to an estimated 90% at present. Important 
regional disparities still exist. The Sudan remains a low-income, food-deficit 
country. It ranks 147th on the United Nations Development Program's Human 
Development Index (2007/2008) among 177 countries. 
In the country’s poorest areas, the rapidly growing population includes displaced 
people and returnees. That puts significant pressure on already fragile 
ecosystems. Erosion, loss of soil fertility and damage to watersheds are affecting 
resources. Agricultural productivity is low. Farmers face the impact of the effects 
of climate change, such as water scarcity, on their livelihoods. Volatile food 
prices affect household food security. 
In general, small-scale farmers, herders in the traditional rainfed farming and 
livestock sectors are poorer than those in the irrigated agricultural sector. People 
who do not have land to farm lead a livelihood by undertaking casual labor such 
as collecting firewood and making charcoal. Meanwhile, people living in areas 
that have been or continue to be affected by drought and conflict. The South, 
Darfur, Kordofan and the Red Sea, are the most vulnerable to poverty.  
Isolation is one of the key factors affecting poverty. Isolated settlements have 
little or no access to social services and markets. Within rural communities, 
households without assets and labor are the poorest. They include elderly or 
disabled people, and households headed by women with young dependants. 
Women and girls are the most disadvantaged members of society, less than one 
third of them have access to education. The country’s poorest areas include, 
southern Sudan, with the exception of Western Equatoria, the transition area 
between northern and southern Sudan, the states of Blue Nile, Darfur and 
Kordofan, the states of Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea and White Nile. 
Inadequate development strategies, slow adaptation to climatic volatility, and 
erosion of natural resources are causatives of poverty. These causes have also 
fuelled the prolonged civil conflicts that have had a devastating effect on the 
rural population. Poor rural people, practice subsistence agriculture, and their 
livelihoods are based on crop cultivation, herding and fishing, where available. 
Smallholder farmers are hindered by the limited size of their landholdings, low 
productivity and an inability to improve their incomes. Because of the lack of 
rainfall and domestic water supplies, for most farmers the growing season is 
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brief and crop failures are frequent. Constraints to their livelihoods are 
represented in the unpredictability of rainfall, water shortages during the dry 
season, barriers on migratory routes. Those lead to disputes between pastoral 
and sedentary or between local communities and commercial interests. Access to 
credit, distribution and marketing channels are limited. Farmers have 
inadequate technical knowledge and poor skills in production and marketing. 
They find it difficult to break out of the cycle of low productivity and income. 
Seasonal migration of rural workers in pursuit of wage labor opportunities on 
mechanized and irrigated farms and in urban areas is widespread. 
The impacts of conflicts on poverty incidence in Sudan are enormous. More than 
two decades of civil unrest in the Sudan have cost the lives of about 2 million 
people and had a devastating effect on the well-being of the population. 
Protracted civil conflict in the Sudan generally has its origin in socioeconomic 
inequities caused by neglect of the agricultural sector. Instantly, there were 
misguided land reforms, unfair distribution of resources for development 
between urban and rural areas. For irrigated and traditional farming, the 
exclusion of local communities from decision-making had its impacts. These 
policies have led to the development of an economy based mainly on export and 
lease of natural resources, to competition over access to scarce land and water 
and to inadequate nation's building. 
 
4. Causes of Social Instabilities 
After decades of internal conflict the Sudan signed a peace agreement in January 
2005 and the new Governments of National Unity and Southern Sudan launched 
a six-year recovery, peace-building and development plan. However, many 
factors attributed to the social instabilities in the country. The first is expressed 
in natural disasters, e.g., floods of 1988 and a multitude of droughts that hit 
many parts of the country. 
The second manifests in the recurrent changes in the political regime and hence 
in the country's institutional structure and the continuation of the Civil War in 
the southern Sudan that restarted in 1983. Inceptions of rebellions in Darfur 
region in 2003 was followed by similar movements in the East of the country. 
The conducted elections in 2010 are supposed to be followed by a ballot to 
decide for the separation of the south or not in January 2011. The instabilities of 
the political situation generated institutional interregnum between and with 
regions and states. 
The previous events genuinely affect parameters of social security in the country, 
e.g., unemployment levels and supporting institutions. Moreover, they had 
certain impacts on population strata and social formulations all around the 
country. A certain social formation was generated by civic instability, 
represented in the internally displaced. Today that is present in considerable 
portions of the Sudanese demographic formation. Statistically, it is 3 millions in 
Greater Darfur region, or 36% of its total population, 600,000 of the Eastern 
Sudan, or 15% of its population and 1.2 Millions in the capital Khartoum or 24% 
of its urban population. However, the numbers are less than expected and 
definitely less than 5 years ago. Large portion of refuges in the Sudan's capital 
refugees settled and housed in newly built towns around Khartoum or returned 
to the Southern Sudan. However, more refugees flood to the country's largest 
urban areas. An estimated 600,000 people settle every year in cities. All these 
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numbers are direly in need for water, hospitals and jobs. The vision for social 
security are blur with the civil conflicts, economic restrains and dwindling ability 
of donors to give more for the country's increasing needs. 
New phenomenon is represented in the increasing numbers of universities and 
higher educational colleges due to the High Education Revolution declared by the 
present regime 20 years ago. Visions for better employment policies are 
required. Unemployment rates are getting high. Thus, the quality of the provided 
job opportunities should be amalgamated with social security parameters. 
The subsequent analysis will introduce more of the above-mentioned social 
security parameters and try to implement them with the analysis the concept of 
Social Floor. Though the selected parameters: economic impacts, health and 
education and the political impacts, are few but they give some view on the 
general situation as affected by the pre and post civil wars. 
 
5. The Analytic Model 
We use a simple regression analysis to fortify the discussion carried out here 
that depends on statistical data provided from official records. The parameters 
are comparisons between available resources during peaceful and civil war 
periods. However, the inception of the conflicts in Darfur that started in 2003 
cannot be accounted for in the analysis as no solid peace agreement has been 
held yet to compare with and dummy representation is not available to cater for 
possible verifications. 
The simple model is based on: 
1- For the economic impacts, Y represents GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth rate, 
Investment share, Government expenditure and inflation in the equations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
the first dependable variable.  
2- Independent variables X2, X2 are present for Pre-civil war (1972-1982) and Impacts of civil 
war (1983-2005), consequently. 
 
Table (2) Pre- and post-war comparison 
The Economic Impacts 
Dependent 
Variable  
Pre-Civil War 
(1972-1982) 
Impacts of Civil 
Wars (1983-
2005) 
GDP per capita  0.150**  
(0.046)  
-0.252**  
(0.122)  
GDP per capita  
growth rate  
2.381*  
(0.399)  
3.395**  
(1.277)  
Investment  
share  
0.166  
(0.022)  
1.387**  
(0.232)  
Government  
expenditure  
0.957**  
(0.141)  
2.137  
(0.357)  
Inflation  
13.048**  
(5.404)  
10.643**  
(5.319)  
**Significant at 99%. 
*Significant at 95%. 
3- Impacts on health Y: infant mortality, adult female mortality, adult male mortality, primary 
and secondary school enrollments is dependant on pre-civil war (1972-1982) and Impacts of 
civil wars (1983-2005). 
Table (3) Impacts on Health and Education 
Dependent  
variable  
Pre-Civil War 
(1972-1982) 
Impacts of Civil 
Wars (1983-
2005) 
Infant mortality  1.211**  5.314**  
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(1.259)  (0.924)  
Adult female  
mortality  
2.202**  
(5.332)  
5.129  
(4.956)  
Adult male  
mortality  
11.233**  
(4.111)  
18.423**  
(3.266)  
Primary school  
enrollment  
3.117**  
(1.687)  
5.814**  
(1.515)  
Secondary school  
enrollment  
5.853  
(1.235)  
16.680**  
(1.343)  
3- The dependant variables in this model are Political stability and Civil liberties and rights which 
were treated as qualitative data and utilized in the analysis after having given binary values. 
 
 
Table (4) The Political Impacts 
Dependent  
Variable  
Pre-Civil War 
(1972-1982) 
Impacts of Civil 
Wars (1983-
2005) 
Politic Stability 
2.330**  
(0.266)  
5.128**  
(0.469)  
Civil liberties and  
political rights  
0.553**  
(0.030)  
4.342**  
(0.127)  
 
6. The Current Situation 
The intensity of civil war violence relatively faded in the south. However, the 
conflict escalation in Darfur increased the social disturbances. Early-life 
exposure to civil wars had impacts and affects labor-market outcomes later in 
life. The impacts of armed conflict in Sudan gave an experience of a tenacious 
and brutally effective civil war. That was sensitive to social stability and hence to 
applying measurements for social floor. That generated social scourge 
particularly in early-life exposure to civil war violence specially, at the first 36 
months of life. On income levels, civil war leads to fall in adult monthly earnings. 
Heterogeneity in the earnings impacts emerge when considering variation in the 
types of civil war. Sexual violations affect the wages of women. Meanwhile 
torture and forced disappearances affects the wages of men. Health and 
schooling rates are important channel in connecting early-life exposure to civil 
war and adult earnings. According to scholars like Kriger (1992) violence against 
and between civilians is the most important attribute of civil wars. A minimum of 
eight out of ten people murdered in civil wars have been civilians. Civil wars also 
are associated with mass murder, forced disappearances, sexual assaults, and 
other types of extreme violence. They are deliberately inflicted with the purpose 
of intimidating civilians through exemplary terror (Kalyvas 2006). 
It is well documented the direct short-run effects of civil wars include the 
destruction of vital infrastructure, the collapse of institutions, a large number of 
displaced individuals, orphanage children, and a massive loss of life (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) reported their negative impacts 
on economic growth. Justino and Verwimp (2006) showed that one out of five 
Rwandans moved into poverty after the genocide. That is true in the Case of 
Sudan that lost years in the strife manifested in the poor infrastructure especially 
in conflict torn regions. Yet, the long-run consequences of civil wars on human 
capital development, institutions, and social norms are still unclear (Blattman 
and Miguel 2009). However, evidence from formerly displaced people of 
Southern Sudan who stayed long in refugees' camps suggests entrenched 
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Foreign Aid Dependency Syndrome. Many lost their cattle herds, in case of 
nomadic herders. Other, sedentary farmers migrated from their cultivable lands. 
Both turned into aid-handed displaced or marginal jobs takers. Many 
transformed from de facto or potential producers into camps displaced. 
Alternative working opportunities where not available and the traditional ways 
were not available. Their social protection blanket vanished with the loss of their 
income generating facilities. Similar phenomenon is evident for Darfur 
population. More petty jobs seekers, homeless or beggars are represented more 
in the Sudanese urban and suburban areas. Reports of increased numbers of 
street-children are evident. Probably, early life exposure to civil war had torn or 
deprived them of their families. That should affect labor-market earnings later in 
life, following the critical-period theory (Godfrey and Barker 2000). That is the 
impact of two decades where the country experienced the actions of a tenacious, 
brutally effective and long civil conflict. The social and economic losses from this 
spiral of violence were dramatic.  
Economic subtractions from development, is evident because of the strife at an 
estimated economic losses for the civil war in the south (1983-2005) is at the 
fringe of US$12 billion dollars in addition to foreign debts of US$37. The latter 
was supposed to be used in projects, which feasibly could have provided social 
havens and income generating institutions if properly used under good 
governance regimes. The production of violence also led to over 2 millions 
displaced people as a result of serious acts.  
Human capital losses are presented in a body of literature on the legacies of civil 
wars. They suggest that they affect schooling (Chamarbagwala and Moran 2010, 
Shemyakina 2010, Leon 2009) and health outcomes (Akresh et al. 2007, 2009, 
Alderman et al. 2004). Both are negatively impacted by episodes of civil war. The 
scope of human capital models reveals the inevitable effect on total lifetime 
earnings of those affected. Direct evidence on the long-run labor-market 
consequences of civil wars, however, are still a missing gap in the literature. An 
exception is the work of Blattman and Annan (2007) who reported less schooling 
and work experience for former child soldiers in Uganda, and therefore, less 
success in their labor market outcomes as adults. Another view was illustrated 
by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). They reported that increases in Sierra 
Leone combatants' violence exposure was negatively correlated with 
employability. Such study, however, did not restrict labor-market analysis to 
former combatants, but rather used a large national representative sample of 
civilians exposed to civil war at the very beginning of their lives. Moreover, the 
violence shocks for several periods before and after birth uncover evidence 
about sensitive or critical period: early childhood, and preschool exposure. 
Furthermore, data enables us to assess the long-run impacts of civil war violence, 
which improves over limited time horizons of most civil war datasets. That is 
consistent with the findings in literature for some conventional or international 
wars (Hearst and Newman 1986 and Angrist 1990). 
Recent research in economics relates conditions in early life to outcomes in later 
life. This literature help to identify shocks that have long-lasting effects, 
understanding the mechanisms of underlying shocks' persistence and 
highlighting potential pathways connecting childhood and adult outcomes. 
However, the long-run effects on health or environmental shocks in early life on 
adult health is presented in Strauss and Thomas (1998), Alderman and Behrman 
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(2006), and Maccini and Yang (2009). The negative impacts on schooling 
attainment are presented in Glewe and King (2001), Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2004) and Alderman et al. (2006). 
The civil war in Sudan began in the southern part and spread other regions of the 
country. Regional variations in the timing and intensity of violence identify its 
effects on labor-market earnings. Similar strategies were used in other studies 
addressing the impact of civil war violence on human capital outcomes (Akresh 
et al. 2006, 2009; Chamarbagwala and Moran 2010; Shemyakina 2010). 
Literature review by way of a systematic analysis reveals the impacts of violence. 
Civil war inherently affected the majority of civil war and that had impacts on the 
effectiveness of possible launching of social security schemes. Such impacts are 
described by Blattman and Miguel (2009). The actual intensity of violence does 
not separate transitory shocks from secular trends in violence conditions. 
However, distinction between civil war and violence in civil wars is often 
overlooked in the micro data analysis of civil wars as postulated by Kalyvas 
(2006). Accounting for civil war violence is primarily based on a single specific 
measure of violence, including deaths as emphasized by Chamarbagwala and 
Moran (2010) and abductions (Blattman and Annan 2009), length of exposure to 
civil war (Akresh et al. 2009, Leon 2009), and damage to household dwellings 
(Shemyakina 2010). 
In literature, the heterogeneity of civil war impacts has five characteristics: 
violence: sexual violations, forced disappearances, abductions, killings and 
forced detentions and torture. The most sensitive period to early-life exposure to 
civil war violence is the first 36 months of life. Early childhood exposure to 
violence leads to a fall in adult monthly earnings. That is an indicator of strong 
impacts of the incidence of civil war. Women are more affected by civil war 
violence than men, which affects the long-run earnings of urban people, as 
compared to those living in rural locations. The substantial heterogeneity in the 
impacts of civil war on adult earnings depends on the type of civil war violence 
experienced. Exposure to torture and forced disappearances yields the strongest 
negative impacts; sexual violations proportionally affect the wages of women, 
while torture and forced disappearances negatively affect the wages of men. 
Focusing only on the most common types of violence, deaths and abductions, 
may underestimate the overall impact of civil war. The psychological distress 
that attaches to other types of violence may have stronger long-lasting human 
capital impacts. The mechanisms connecting adult earnings and violence suggest 
that health is affected. Armed violence during early childhood is significantly 
associated with sustainable chances for education. Additionally, schooling 
attainment is negatively affected by exposure to civil war and adult earnings. 
In 1983, Sudan witnessed the re-continuation of one of the world's longest 
deadliest civil conflict. However, the civil war in Sudan did not follow the 
conventional prediction in such armed conflicts that flourish in resource rich 
regions because of the existence of more rents to fight over (Le Billon 2005). 
Weinstein's (2006) typology of an activist rebellion where grievance trump 
greed and participation is risky, short-term gains were unlikely. Highly 
committed militants resemble investors dedicated to the cause of the 
organization and willing to make risky investments in return for the promise of 
future rewards (Weinstein 2006). The initial response from the government was 
ineffective. The operations used strategic force. However, rapid economic 
Journal GJHSS Volume 11 Issue 2 
 
March 2011 
10 
assistance, to bolster local economic conditions in the initially affected areas was 
not visible. The military forces were reportedly accused of using indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. This strategy did not cease, but rather fueled the 
expansion of the civil war. Kalyvas (2006) documents 100 studies and 45 
historical cases where state violence against civilians provoked a greater 
insurgence violence, as a response. The result was the collapse of traditional 
social security and cohesion systems in addition to all existing infrastructure 
supporting economic structures in all civil war ridden regions. 
 
7. Regional Impacts on Some Social Parameters 
The following table (6) illustrates some parameters that give evidence of the 
condition in the Southern region. Though four years passed since the peace 
agreement, the numbers of local conflicts kept on rising. Data on displacement 
reveals that there are 400.000 refugees, which is over 8% of the region's 
population. Food production is still at the same levels during the civil war years. 
Illiteracy is at 87% rate and people with no sources for clean water records 48% 
of the region's population. Acute mal nutrition rates are high and the life 
expectancy is less than that of Northern parts of the Sudan. 
 
Table (6) Profile of the Situation in Southern Sudan 2009 
2500Victims of Local Conflicts
400,000Number of Refugees
7Number of States Enduring Violance
7.2Number of Small Arms (millions
3.4Number of People in Need for Food Aid
5.1Number of People Suffering Food Insecurity
85%NGO Services to Public Services
87%Illetracy
42Life Expectancy at Birth
8.14%Acute Mal Nutrition Rate
48%People with no Clean Water Access
8.15%Children in Primary Schools
UNDP, 2009
 
The minimized contribution of the government in providing public services is 
revealed by the percentage of the NGO participation in services to the people, 
which are health, clean water and education.  
When the civil war expanded to other regions, they were under the siege of 
political violence. The cycle of political violence worsened even more. It began 
against the government. However, civilians were most affected. The end of civil 
war occurred in 2005 when peace agreement was signed. However, the Darfur 
was different. Though the conflict there seems to fit the activist rebellion 
typology developed by Weinstein (2006), it does not follow its main prediction. 
The armed conflict was marked by deliberate indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. The production of violence was provided by at least many competing 
parties, with the purpose of matching their opponent's violence to create fear in 
civilians. The number of serious violence acts, i.e., killings, forced disappearances 
and sexual abuses. That seriously affected the economic activities, traditional 
settlement and livelihood of sedentary population. Activist rebellion type 
predicts that movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate into 
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low levels of indiscriminate violence and employ violence selectively and 
strategically. On the other hand, the rebellion type predicts that civil wars 
emerging in rich natural resources areas tend to commit high levels of 
indiscriminate violence (Weinstein 2006). It highlights the limitations of building 
unified conceptual categories to describe diverse civil war movements. Kalyvas 
(2000) defined a typology of civil war based on the interaction of two key 
elements of violence: its purpose and its production. According to this typology, 
the armed conflict corresponds to civil war violence.   
The intensity of early life exposure to the cycle of armed violence depends on 
where and when the individuals were born. Some places may not experience a 
single violent act, where others do. The years 1984 and 1985 were extremely 
violent, while 1987 was relatively peaceful.   
The low coverage of social security programs in developing countries is often 
attributed to the dual nature of their labor markets. Implicit in this view is that 
workers are rationed out of social security against their will because they are 
unable to find formal jobs with benefits.  Throughout the world, social security 
programs have been introduced to insure consumption in old age. For salaried 
workers, participation in these programs is linked to employment; employers 
are required by law to register workers and transfer a certain share of workers’ 
wages to pension administrators. In practice, however many employers do not 
enroll their workers in these plans. Some workers may contribute in former jobs 
and thus accrue some pension rights. However, participation rates are very low, 
suggesting that a large share of the labor force may not receive a pension or will 
retire with meager benefits.  
Most studies attribute the high rates of non-participation or the informal 
employment, to the characteristics and regulations prevailing in the labor 
market or to the characteristics of the firms. Some studies emphasize the 
importance of wage rigidities caused by labor regulations, unions or efficiency 
wages, which lead to rationing of formal sector jobs with benefits (Harris and 
Todaro, 1970; Esfahani, Hadi and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989; Agénor, 2005). Other 
studies, explain informality as the result of the decisions of firms (Levenson and 
Maloney, 1998). In this view, firms decide whether to engage in formal 
institutions by assessing the benefits and costs of doing so, with the outcome of 
the cost structure and characteristics of firms. Participation in social security 
becomes exogenous to workers’ decisions. Workers with weak preferences for 
participating in social insurance programs sort into jobs in which social security 
is easier to evade. The possibility that workers preferences are likely to underlie 
participation in social insurance is presented in health insurance literature in 
developed countries (Monheit and Vistnes, 2006).   
 
8. The Social Floor 
The broad concepts of Social Floor contain seven pillars we outline and analyze 
the situation in the Sudan as follows: 
The first pillar is that social security is a Human Right as postulated in Article 22 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states that: Everyone, as a 
member of society, has the right to social security. That is difficult to presume 
under the current conditions with non-participative fact of several regional 
populations' powers. The successive regimes that controlled the country 
produced continuous erosion of such concept. After almost 60 years of 
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independence, that remains a dream for the majority of the country's population. 
The ILO’s Philadelphia Declaration was the extension of social security measures 
to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive 
medical care. Subsequently, the ILO launched a campaign in 2003 to extend 
social security to all with a proposed set of rights as a social security floor.  
That is hardly applicable for the Sudan with an estimated 10% of its population 
in displaced camps and over 90% under the poverty line globally specified. That 
makes the task difficult in implementation. Moreover, over 70% of the 
population is deprived of basic requirements of clean water, basic medical and 
educational facilities. Therefore, providing the required services which will set 
the base for building-up SSS essentially call for international help and wider 
strategic planning to cater for that. That is difficult to achieve with the current 
civil conflicts in Sudan. 
The second pillar is that: Social security is a social necessity. There is no solid 
data set to cater for an achievement of such a parameter. However, with over 
90% of the Sudanese people living under poverty and 70% are deprived of basic 
facilities, it is logical to propose that at least 80% of the Sudanese population 
lives in social insecurity. Some research data proposed that 40% of them live in 
utter destitute. Sudan also records the highest infants' mortality less than 5 years 
of age, due to lack of access to health care and lack of income security. With 
hypothetical assumptions' social security is expected to reduce poverty. 
Household surveys show high concentrations of revenues in the urban. Social 
security systems should reduce income inequality. 
The third pillar is that Social security is an economic necessity. That concept is 
necessary in order to convince governments and societies to spend on social 
protection. Thus, they can countries grow with equity. Countries that have been 
the most successful in achieving long-term sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction have all put in place extensive systems of social security at an early 
stage. In Sudan, that is inevitably necessary as differences between urban and 
rural areas, between states and regions are highly manifested. Most states rely 
on the Central Government support for subsidies to run their administrative cost 
and other basic facilities. Moreover, it has been stated in most negotiations, 
literature and by politicians that unless development is defused in all the 
country's regions rebellion may expand. 
The fourth pillar is that basic social security for all should be fiscally affordable. 
Economies cannot develop and grow without a productive workforce. In order to 
unlock a country’s full growth potential one has to fight social exclusion, 
ignorance, unemployment. Social transfers are most directly and most effectively 
reach out to the excluded and the poor and those who have to adapt to economic 
change and thus maintain their productivity. Access to social health protection 
improves productivity levels. Social transfers also cushion the effects of 
economic downturns on domestic demand. As expected, in developing countries 
have multiplier effects on local markets and transfers in kind my have negative 
effects on prices. Again, the cost of civil conflicts in Sudan makes it impossible to 
achieve such a parameter. Defense and security consumes over 70% of the GNP. 
The remains give inadequate sums funds to finance SSS. 
The fifth pillar we propose here is to support social cohesion in the country. That 
is basically vital in a country that endured civic strife for sixty years. The 
cohesive relationships traditionally that existed between its societies were 
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eroded by long conflicts about resources and power. Sudan, as a traditional 
society, in whole, suffered stigmas of discrimination, elitism, marginalization and 
destitute. Without applying institutional basis that protect and provide 
irrevocable constitutional rights for individuals, societies and people building up 
social cohesion based on social welfare is a delusion. Moreover, such social 
cohesion is vital to support traditional social systems that long protected 
economic activities, e.g., rights for nomadic activities and pastures, collective 
farming and traditional marketing and bartership.  
The sixth pillar is represented in the definition of SSS floor per se. Globally, less 
than 2% of the Global GDP is required to provide a basic set of social protection 
benefits to all people that have to live on less than one dollar a day as stated 
years ago. However, such specified minimum income is unrealistic today with 
the rife inflation seen in Sudan as much as other parts in the world. Recession 
adds to the dilemma, with the increasing rates of unemployment and the 
deteriorating rates of investment in the real economic production sectors. The 
latter, amplify job generation chances. Both combined produce stagflation, which 
is the most serious impediment for SSS creation. A minimum package of social 
security benefits is affordable in even the poorest countries as recent work by 
the ILO on the cost of a minimum package of social security benefits in sub-
Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America has shown. A basic package of modest 
pensions and child benefits can reduce the poverty by 40% in poor developing 
countries at a cost of 3-4% of GDP in some African countries. The case is 
prevalent in Sudan with high rates of inflation that even conquer the logics of 
modifying available pensions to meet the required needs. Thereby, investments 
in a basic set of social security benefits will have minimum cost compared to 
expected building-up of social networks. Logical hope is to minimize 
expenditures on armament and divert their funds to SSS, development of 
infrastructure and means of production. 
The vision should not elude the paradox, if Sudan can afford the cost of social 
security. It should be directed towards what schemes can introduce, where and 
quickly. The guarantees of access to basic health benefits, through a set of sub-
systems linked together, e.g., a public health service funded by taxes, social and 
private insurance and micro-insurance systems. Moreover, income security 
provided to family/child should produce benefits to facilitate access to basic 
social services, i.e., education, health and housing. That should guarantee access 
to basic social assistance for the poor and unemployed in active age groups. Thus 
income security is guaranteed for the people including those in old age, invalid 
and survivors through basic pensions. Decisively, it is relative with serious 
decision-making, planners and those who direct funds. Both are institutionally 
defined. However, under the prevalent conditions, it seems that an institutional 
interregnum exist between what is planned and what is executed in reality. 
Two essentially things are basically required: 
1- A Global Strategy that contains an international standard/instrument that 
defines minimum benefit benchmarks for defined stages of development. 
That can be used by national advocacy groups to promote the development of 
national systems integrated into international development policy agendas. 
Thus, donors can allocated and focus on funding social floor development 
plans. The UN, UNICEF and support building a Global Social Floor Coalition  
campaign for the introduction of a Global Social Security Floor. That should 
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aim at creating global political consensus. However, reaching for a finally 
formula is vital to set an applicable pattern. 
2- Defining National Action to engulf national action plans and draw-up credible 
and pragmatic roadmaps for the development of social floor benefits. The 
mandatory should be that the supporting national social floor development, 
initiate plans for new pilots. Thereby, it shall be through a full range of 
financial and administrative analyses and the support of national consensus 
to build dialogue processes. That requires including such National Action into 
a constitutional structure to guarantee it implementation. 
 
Conclusions 
Currently, the primary challenge to social security in Sudan is the state of 
continuous institutional interregnum caused by instabilities in parts of the 
country. Such state detains efforts to establish social protection measures from 
providing the necessary results. In order to establish any coherent parameters 
for social floor, it is essential for a comprehensively stabilized system. 
Subsequent implementation should focus on specific lines institutionally defined 
and applied. Otherwise, efforts shall be lost. 
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